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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sandee Denise Cargile appeals in three separate cases. In 38855, Ms. Cargile 
appeals from the Judgment of Conviction, wherein the district court imposed upon her a 
unified thirteen-year sentence, with four years fixed, following her conditional guilty plea 
to possession of a controlled substance. She asserts that the district court erred in 
denying her suppression motion because officers violated her constitutional rights to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure when they unreasonably extended the 
length of the stop in order to have a drug dog run around the vehicle. 
In 38867, Ms. Cargile appeals from the Order Of Revocation of Probation and 
Imposition of Sentence and Commitment. She contends the district court abused its 
discretion when it executed the underlying sentence of five years, with one year fixed, 
following her admission to violating probation. 
In 38868, Ms. Cargile appeals from the Judgment & Commitment wherein the 
district court imposed upon her a unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed, 
following her guilty plea to escape. Ms. Cargile asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion imposing an excessive sentence upon her. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A Supreme Court Docket Number 38855 
On the evening of June 23, 2010, Ms. Cargile drove her older 1964 pickup truck 
in the area of Overland and Five Mile in Boise Idaho. (Tr.10/28/2010, p.63, Ls.8-10, 
p.45, Ls.9-12.) There was a significant amount of traffic traveling both directions. 
(Tr.10/28/2012, p.64, Ls.12-20.) During a turn, Ms. Cargile failed to use a turn signal 
1 
and continued driving for approximately two miles before Deputy Vogt initiated a traffic 
stop. 1 (Tr.10/25/2010, p.45, Ls.13-23.) The deputy did not immediately stop 
Ms. Cargile because he wanted to follow her to observe her driving patterns. 
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.45, Ls.19-23.) He did not observe any signs that would indicate that 
Ms. Cargile might have been intoxicated, nor did he observe any other bad driving 
patterns. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.62, Ls.7-10, p.82, L.25-p.83, L.2, p.83, Ls.3-5.) 
Although the deputy could not recall if she was wearing sunglasses, he thought 
she was looking at him out of the corner of her eye. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.63, Ls.14-17, 
p.64, Ls.1-2, p.83, Ls.13-15.) He believed she avoided looking directly at him in the 
mirror. (Tr.10/25/2012, p.63, Ls.4-6, 14-17.) Before activating his lights, which were 
located down in the windshield of the vehicle and not on the overhead of the car, 
Deputy Vogt called for a canine unit. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.82, Ls.8-10, p.83, Ls.9-12.) 
Ms. Cargile was traveling in the inner lane, closest to the center lane. (Tr.10/25/2010, 
p.65, Ls.3-8.) After activating his lights, Ms. Cargile continued driving for approximately 
a quarter of a mile. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.46, Ls.11-14.) He thought she was trying to act 
as if she did not see him. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.63, Ls.21-24.) In order to obtain 
Ms. Cargile's attention, Deputy Vogt activated his siren with a few quick audible burst. 
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.46, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Cargile turned into the center turn lane, pulled into 
a business' parking lot off Overland, and parked in an actual marked parking lot stall, 
which the officer thought was strange. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.67, Ls.9-19.) 
Although the deputy testified that Ms. Cargile's parking decision made him 
nervous, he immediately approached the vehicle without waiting for backup that had 
1 For purposes of the suppression motion, Ms. Cargile conceded that she committed a 
traffic infraction, although she disputed the factual basis that she failed to use her turn 
signal. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.91, L.21-p.92, L.6.) 
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already been called nor used any other unusual procedure to approach her. 
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.60, Ls.19-p.68, Ls.5-22.) He approached to speak with her about the 
turn signal violation. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.68, Ls.23-25.) When Deputy Vogt made contact 
with Ms. Cargile, he believed she appeared nervous when he requested her license and 
registration. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.48, Ls.1-7.) With Ms. Cargile's license and registration 
in hand, Deputy Vogt returned to his car and quickly learned that her license was valid 
and she had no warrants for her arrest. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.48, Ls.12-16.) He also 
learned that Ms. Cargile had previous drug arrests and a concealed weapons arrest. 
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.48, Ls.12-16.) 
In the meantime, Deputy Picola arrived with the canine. (Tr.10/25/2012, p.48, 
Ls.17-21.) The two deputies discussed Ms. Cargile's arrest record. (Tr.10/25/2012, 
p.48, L.24-p.49, L.1.) Eight minutes after stopping Ms. Cargile, Deputy Vogt was ready 
to run the drug dog around her vehicle. (Tr.10/25/2012, p.48, L.17-p.49, L.1, p.73, 
Ls.13-19, p.87, Ls.10-16.) 
Deputy Vogt approached Ms. Cargile and demanded that she exit her vehicle. 
(Tr.10/25/2010, p.49, Ls.8-9.) Ms. Cargile refused to exit her vehicle and attempted to 
lock the officers out of her truck. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.49, L.25-p.50,L.2.) Deputy Vogt told 
Ms. Cargile that she was under arrest and reached in through the window and physical 
detained Ms. Cargile. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.50, Ls.3-5.) Deputy Picola entered through the 
passenger side door, threw Ms. Cargile's belongings on the ground, and opened the 
door for Deputy Vogt. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.50, Ls.5-6.) The canine alerted on 
Ms. Cargile's bag on the ground. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.50, L.18-p.51, L.1.) 
Deputy Vogt did not cite Ms. Cargile for failing to use her turn signal. 
(Tr.10/25/2012, p.84, Ls.1-4, p.86, Ls.20-22.) The prosecutor charged Ms. Cargile by 
3 
Information with the crimes of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver, resisting and/or obstructing an officer, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
(R.38855, pp.34-35.) 
Ms. Cargile filed a Motion And Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Exclude 
Evidence And Dismiss Case. (R. 38855, pp.53-61.) She argued that the officer 
abandoned the reasons for stopping her and conducted an illegal search. (R. 38855, 
pp.53-61.) After receiving additional discovery, Ms. Cargile filed an additional 
memorandum in anticipation of the State's argument that Ms. Cargile lacked standing to 
challenge the illegal search of her vehlcle. (R. 38855, pp.65-72.) 
The State filed their objection to Ms. Cargile's motion. It argued that she waived 
her Fourth Amendment Right when she agreed to probation in Supreme Court Docket 
Number 38867. (R.38855, pp.74-93.) At the hearing, the State also argued that the 
duration of the traffic stop, including waiting for the drug dog to arrive, did not exceed 
the initial purpose or scope of the stop. (Tr.10/25/2012, p.100, Ls.5-19, p.103, L.22.) 
The traffic stop was expanded due to Ms. Cargile's suspicious actions. (Tr.10/25/2012, 
p.101, L.1-p.102, L.22.) Finally, the State argued that the officers would have inevitably 
discovered the drugs because of Ms. Cargile's arrest for obstruction. (Tr.10/25/2012, 
p.102, L.23-p.103, L.6.) 
After conducting a hearing, the district court denied Ms. Cargile's motion. 
(R.38855, pp.101-102, 146-151.) Initially, the district court found that Ms. Cargile 
consented to the search as a condition of her felony probation; however, it reversed its 
decision holding that the Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Turek, Docket No. 
36596, 2011 Opinion No. 8, filed March 2, 2011, effectively overruled its decision. 
(R., p.146.) The court found that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion of 
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criminal activity. (R., p.149.) Therefore, the facts permitted a lawful expansion of the 
purpose of the stop. (R., p.150.) Additionally, the stop was not expanded beyond the 
reasonable time for the traffic stop. (R., p.150.) The court determined that the facts 
allowed the officers to continue the investigation and pursuant to Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), allowed the officers to demand Ms. Cargile exit her 
vehicle. (R., p.150.) Alternatively, the district court determined that the resisting and 
obstructing arrest would have led to the inevitable discovery of the methamphetamine 
and paraphernalia. (R., p.150.) 
Ms. Cargile entered into a conditional guilty plea. (Tr.11/04/2010, p.1, Ls.12-17; 
R., pp.123-124.) She agreed to plead guilty to the charges, reserving her right to 
challenge the district court's decision to deny the suppression motion. (Tr.11/04/2010, 
p.1, Ls.12-17, p.2, Ls.3-6, p.23, Ls.1-8; R., pp.123-124.) The district court imposed 
upon Ms. Cargile a unified sentence of thirteen years, with four years fixed. 
(Tr.05/26/2011, p.13, Ls.13-16; R., pp.155, 158-162.) Ms. Cargile timely appealed. 
(R., pp.163, 164-166.) 
B. Supreme Court Docket Number 38867 
In Supreme Court docket number 38867 (district court # H0400363), the 
prosecutor charged Ms. Cargile by Information with possession of a controlled 
substance and concealing a dangerous weapon. (R.38867, pp.30-31.) Defense 
counsel moved for a competency evaluation (R. 38867, pp.49-50) and the district court 
ordered the I.C. § 18-211 examination (R. 38867, pp.53-55). After the court found her 
competent, the case proceeded to trial. (R. 38867, pp.64-65.) In August 2004, 
Ms. Cargile agreed to plead guilty to both counts; in exchange, the State agreed to 
dismiss another case, and to "open recommendation for probation, jail." (R. 38867, 
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pp.68-69.) In September 2004, the district court imposed upon Ms. Cargile a unified 
sentence of five years, with one year fixed, for her guilty plea to possession of a 
controlled substance.2 (R. 38867, pp.76, 81-88.) The district court suspended the 
sentence and placed her probation for five years probation. (R. 38867, pp. 76, 81-88.) 
In 2006, the probation officer requested and the court authorized discretionary jail 
time because Ms. Cargile tested positive for amphetamines four separate times 
between April 18, 2005 and February 24, 2006. (R. 38867, p.108.) A few months later, 
the probation officer alleged that Ms. Cargile tested positive for amphetamine, 
thereafter, failed to submit to several urinalysis tests, and, then again tested positive for 
amphetamines. (R. 38867, pp.109-110.) The district court approved discretionary jail 
time. (R. 38867, p.110.) In March 2007, the prosecutor filed a motion for probation 
violation. (R. 38867, pp.120-124.) Ms. Cargile admitted to four of the allegations, the 
court dismissed the remaining allegations. (R. 38867, pp.129, 131.) The district court 
revoked probation and placed 1\/ls. Cargile in the retained jurisdiction program. 
(R. 38867, pp.137, 138-140.) After Ms. Cargile successfully participated in the 
programming, the district court suspended execution of the sentence and placed 
1\/ls. Cargile on probation for seven (7) years, starting at the original date of the 
judgment. (R. 38867, pp.143, 145-148.) 
In July 2010, the probation officer filed a motion for probation violation. 
(R. 38867, pp.165-168.) The prosecutor alleged that Ms. Cargile committed new crimes 
of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to delivery, resisting and/or 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Cargile's motion to augment to include a 
number of transcripts relevant to Supreme Court Docket Number 38867. See Order 
dated December 21, 2011. Therefore, counsel will rely on the clerk's record to support 
her arguments. 
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obstructing, and possessed drug paraphernalia on June 23, 2010. (R. 38867, pp.165-
168.) Additionally, the prosecutor alleged that Ms. Cargile used drugs on several days 
in 2007 and 2008. (R. 38867, pp.165-168.) Ms. Cargile admitted she violated 
probation. (Tr.11/08/2010, p.8, Ls.20-23; R. 38867, pp.188-189.) She admitted she 
committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, 
possessed metharnphetamine, committed the crime of resisting and/or obstructing an 
officer, committed the crime of possessing drug paraphernalia, and possessed drug 
paraphernalia. (Tr.11/8/2010, p.9, L.9-p.10, L.22.) While waiting for the disposition of 
her probation hearing, the district court granted Ms. Cargile a temporary furlough. 
(R.38867, pp.195-197.) Ms. Cargile escaped while on the furlough. (R. 38867, pp.201-
202.) The prosecutor filed another allegation of probation violation because Ms. Cargile 
allegedly committing a new crime of escape. (R. 38867, pp.217-219.) The district court 
revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence of five years, with one year 
fixed. (R.38867, pp.228-229; 230-232.) Ms. Cargile timely appealed the Order Of 
Revocation Of Probation And Imposition Of Sentence And Commitment. (R.38867, 
pp.233-235.) 
C. Supreme Court Docket Number 38868 
In Supreme Court docket number 38868 (district court# CR-FE-2010-0020122), 
the prosecutor charged Ms. Cargile by Information with the crime of escape. (R., pp.20-
21.) Ms. Cargile pleaded guilty to escape and, in exchange, the State agreed to make 
specific sentencing recommendations. (Tr.05/19/2011, p.5, L.21-p.6, L.2, p.12, Ls.10-
12.) She admitted that while in custody on case number 38855 the district court granted 
her a furlough and, instead of returning to custody, she fled to Springdale, Washington. 
(Tr.05/19/2011, p.13, Ls.2-20.) Marshals eventually apprehended her in Hayden, Idaho. 
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(Tr.05/19/2011, p.13, Ls.22-25.) The district court imposed upon Ms. Cargile a unified 
sentence of four years, with one year fixed, to be served consecutive to Supreme Court 
Docket Number 38855. (Tr.05/26/2011, p.13, Ls.16-18.) 
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ISSUES 
1) Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Cargile's suppression motion 
because when Deputy Vogt approached Ms. Cargile's vehicle, for a second time, 
and demanded that she exit her vehicle, he had abandoned the purposes of the 
traffic stop, thereby unreasonably extending the stop beyond the original 
purpose? 
2) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Cargile's probation 
and executed the underlying sentence of five years, with one year fixed? 
3) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms. Cargile a 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Cargile's Suppression Motion Because 
When Deputy Vogt Approached Ms. Cargile's Vehicle, For A Second Time, And 
Demanded That She Exit Her Vehicle, He Had Abandoned The Purposes Of The Traffic 
Stop, Thereby Unreasonably Extending The Stop Beyond The Original Purpose 
A. Introduction 
Law enforcement unreasonably extended the traffic stop lawfully extended the 
stop of Ms. Cargile. As such, the district court's order denying Ms. Cargile's motion to 
suppress should be reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 
336, 338 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted; 
however, the application of constitutlonal principles to the facts as found are freely 
reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886 (2001). At a suppression hearing, the 
power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts 
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 
Idaho 102, 106 (1995). 
C. Law Enforcement Officers Unreasonably Extended The Traffic Stop Of 
Ms. Cargile 
The Idaho and Federal Constitutions protect "[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these 
constitutional rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of 
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discretion by governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and 
security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The constitutions 
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the seizures of 
persons through detentions falling short of arrest or arrests. United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). The stop of a 
vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is, therefore, subject to the 
constitutional restraints. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct. App. 1998). A 
vehicle stop is of limited magnitude compared to other types of seizures; however, it is 
nonetheless a "constutionally cognizable" intrusion and, therefore, may not be 
conducted "at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials." Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 
When the purpose of the detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense or 
other crime, it must be based upon reasonable, aritculable suspicion of criminal activity. 
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2001); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
498 (1983). Although the required information leading to formation of reasonable 
suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the information required to form 
probable cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch on the part of 
the police officer." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005). The 
reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the seizure. Flowers, 131 Idaho at 208. 
In the case at hand, during a turn, Ms. Cargile failed to use a turn signal and 
continued driving for approximately two miles before Deputy Vogt initiated a traffic stop. 
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(Tr.10/25/2010, p.45, Ls.13-23.) Ms. Cargile does not challenge the legality of the initial 
detention. However, she asserts that the officers unreasonably extended the stop. 
A routine traffic stop is normally limited in scope and of short duration; therefore, 
it is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and, as such, is 
analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440 
U.S. at 653-654. Under Terry, an investigative detention is permissible if it is based 
upon specific aritculable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has 
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 21. 
The question of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires an 
inquiry into both whether the officer's action was justified at the inception, and whether it 
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2000). However, the 
purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated; a routine traffic stop might 
turn up suspicious circumstances that justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the 
stop. Id. at 362. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that an investigative detention 
"must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Further, an individual "may not be detained even 
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Id. In United 
States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001 ), the court held that, "[f]urther detention 
was not lawful after the point at which the purposes of the stop [were] resolved." Id. at 
398. 
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It is therefore not necessarily a constitutional violation for an officer who has 
stopped someone for a traffic violation to ask unrelated questions about drugs or to run 
a drug dog around the outside of the vehicle. State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563 
(Ct. App. 2005). Idaho Courts have held that the questioning and use of a drug dog 
during a stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment when it does not extend the 
duration of the stop beyond that which was necessary to address the traffic violation. 
See State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852-853 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an officer's 
request to search a car was lawful where the request was made before the issuance of 
the traffic citation had been completed and such request lengthened the process only by 
a second or two); see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-363 (holding that it was 
permissible for one officer to question a vehicle's driver about drugs and weapons and 
to take a drug dog around the car while another officer was busy checking with dispatch 
on the driver's status and writing out a traffic citation). 
In contrast, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that it was an unwarranted 
intrusion upon the vehicle occupants' privacy and liberty for an officer to question a 
driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose 
of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651-653. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that a motorist had been unlawfully detained 
where all routine traffic stop procedures had been completed when additional officers 
arrived and then requested consent to search the vehicle. State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 
532 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Ms. Cargile asserts that the officers improperly extended their stop beyond the 
purpose of issuing a citation for failing to use her turn signal. The State presented no 
evidence that Deputy Vogt had even begun to write the citation during the eight minutes 
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that he had Ms. Cargile seized. Deputy Vogt's testimony revealed that he routinely 
waits before even approaching a vehicle that he has stopped for a traffic violation. He 
stated under oath, "Most the times I'll wait because I've called for that officer, so I want 
to wait for that officer. So a majority of the times, I'll wait for that officer just because I 
ask for them. There is a reason I ask for them, so I want to wait until he gets there 
before I approach." (Tr., p.61, Ls.14-19.) The deputy further explained that his decision 
to contact Deputy Picola was that it was routine to call for him to bring the drug dog to 
the scene. (Tr., p.61, L.24-p.62, L.15.) Therefore, Deputy Vogt's own testimony reveals 
that he consistently and routinely delays a standard traffic stop in order for the drug dog 
to arrive on the scene. 
Although Deputy Vogt also testified about the proper procedure for not violating 
the federal and state constitution, he did not follow that procedure in this case. 
(Tr., p.69, L.23-p.70, L.3.) He explained that once he writes the citation, he approaches 
the driver and asks the driver to exit their vehicle to explain the citation and, in the 
meantime, the drug dog is ran around the vehicle. (Tr., p.69, L.23-p.70, L.3.) However, 
in this case, there was no testimony that Deputy Vogt even began to write the ticket. 
( See generally Tr.10/28/2010.) He prolonged the stop for purposes other than the 
reasons for the stop - the failure to use a turn signal. 
D. The State Failed To Demonstrate That The Officer Possessed Reasonable 
Suspicion To Expand The Scope Of Ms. Cargile's Stop 
In this case, Ms. Cargile was detained longer than necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop. There were no objective grounds for extending the stop. The 
district court's findings to the contrary are in error. 
The district court stated: 
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Vogt had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Vogt is an 
experienced narcotics officer. His reasonable suspicion was based on the 
following articulable facts: Cargille's [sic] eye movements, her refusal to 
stop when Vogt's overhead lights were activated, her continual driving for 
another quarter of a mile, and after Vogt activated his siren she drove 
across the oncoming lane into a parking lot and parked behind buildings 
out of public view. All of this was unusual and alerted Vogt to the 
possibility of additional criminal activity beyond the signal violations. 
(R., pp.149-150.) 
Although the deputy could not recall if she was wearing sunglasses, he thought 
she was looking at him out of the corner of her eye. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.63, Ls.14-1 ?p.64, 
Ls. 1-2, p.83, Ls.13-15.) He believed she avoided looking directly at him in the mirror. 
(Tr.10/25/2012, p.63, Ls.4-6, 14-17.) Yet, cautious and trying to act calm when a police 
officer is behind a driver does not result any suspicion of criminal activity. The officer 
even admitted that it is not uncommon for people to act nervous when an officer is 
behind them. (Tr.10/25/2012, p.62, Ls.18-25.) Regardless, Deputy Vogt knew that he 
was going to look for drugs before he even activated his overhead lights as he called for 
the drug dog to meet him on the scene. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.69, L.23-p.70, L.3, p.82, 
Ls.8-10, p.83, Ls.9-12.) 
Deputy Vogt admitted that there was a significant amount of traffic traveling both 
directions. (Tr.10/28/2012, p.64, Ls.12-20.) Ms. Cargile was traveling in the inner lane, 
closest to the center lane. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.65, Ls.3-8.) She didn't notice the deputy 
for a quarter of a mile; however, when he signaled to her with his siren she turned into 
the turn lane, safely crossed the road, and safely parked in a parking space, not 
blocking the business' driveway. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.46, Ls.11-19, p.67, Ls.9-19.) 
Deputy Vogt admitted that Ms. Cargile's driving did not cause him to believe that she 
was under the influence. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.62, Ls.7-10, p.82, L.25-p.83, L.2, p.83, Ls.3-
5.) 
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Ms. Cargile provided a valid license and registration and had no warrants for her 
arrest. (Tr.10/25/2010, p.48, Ls.12-16.) Although, Ms. Cargile did have a past record, 
that does not provide reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. (Tr.10/25/2010, 
p.48, Ls.12-16.) 
Deputy Vogt made it clear that he was going to run a drug dog around this car 
and he made that decision before he activated the lights to stop Ms. Cargile. Deputy 
Vogt made the decision based upon the circumstances that existed at that moment, 
which was that Ms. Cargile drove an old pickup truck, she failed to use a turn signal, 
and her looks were typical of someone trying to act cool under the circumstances. After 
being alerted by a siren, Ms. Cargile turned into a business on the opposite side of the 
street and pulled into a parking lot stall. Deputy Vogt found this unusual. Under the 
totality of the circumstances, the above facts do not create reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity in order to extend the stop. At best, the officer had a hunch 
and was going to follow with his original decision to have the drug dog ran around the 
vehicle. When he approached the vehicle for the second time, he had abandoned the 
purposes of the stop, which was to issue a ticket for the failure to signal, and because 
he lacked articulable, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he illegally extended the 
scope of the stop. 
E. All Evidence Collected Against Ms. Cargile Following The Unreasonable 
Extension Of The Traffic Stop Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal 
Governmental Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. 
Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, granting establishment of 
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the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at 
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of 
Guilt, p.221 (1959)). 
While the defendant bears the initial burden of going forward with evidence of a 
"factual nexus" between the illegality and the evidence, the State has the ultimate 
burden of persuasion to show that the evidence is untainted. State v. Babb, 136 Idaho 
95, 98 (Ct. App. 2001); see also United States v. Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d 1128, 1131 
(10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kandik, 633 F.2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1980). 
Suppression is required only if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have 
come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 
142 Idaho 180,184 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Nava-Ramirez, 210 3d at 1131). 
In the case at hand, the above evidence clearly shows that Ms. Cargile was only 
legally stopped for a traffic violation and that no evidence was discovered until the 
officers unreasonably extended the stop. This provides the necessary factual nexus, 
and thereby, shifts the burden of persuasion to the State to show that the evidence is 
untainted. The state failed to meet this burden; therefore, all the evidence collected 
after the impermissible extension of the stop (the methamphetamine and paraphernalia) 
must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police activity. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Cargile's Probation And 
Executed The Underlying Sentence Of Five Years, With One Year Fixed 
Ms. Cargile asserts the district court abused its discretion after revoking her 
probation and executing the previously suspended sentence. Ms. Cargile asserts that 
the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce her sentence. 
In a probation revocation proceeding, the district court addresses three issues: 
First, was a condition of probation violated? Second, does the violation justify 
revocation? Finally, if probation is revoked, what prison sentence should be imposed? 
State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The district court is empowered 
with the authority to reduce the original sentence pursuant to Rule 35. Id. On appeal, 
Ms. Cargile does not dispute the district court's findings that she violated probation by 
committing the crime of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, 
possessing methamphetamine, committing the crime of resisting and/or obstructing an 
officer, committing the crime of possessing drug paraphernalia, and possessing drug 
paraphernalia. (Tr.11/8/2010, p.9, L.9-p.10, L.22.) Nor does she dispute the district 
court's decision to revoke probation. However, she contends that the district court 
should have sua sponte reduced her sentence. 
The third question to be answered in a probation revocation proceeding, is what 
prison sentence should be imposed? State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 
2001). In answering this third question, the appellate courts examine the entire record 
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. State v. Adams, 115 
Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a 
sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse 
of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence. State v. Jackson, 130 
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Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). 
Ms. Cargile does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Cargile must show that in light 
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. 
Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001 )). 
Ms. Cargile asserts that, in failing to reduce her sentence, the district court did 
not give proper weight to her remorse and desire to change her ways. Ms. Cargile 
explained at the disposition hearing, "I believe I have touched on all of the subjects of 
my immoralities and I am ready to lead a new life. And with that being said, I am ready 
for your judgment." (Tr.05/27/2011, p.5, Ls.11-14.) In the PSI, Ms. Cargile indicated 
that she realized that she was 35 years old and wasted a majority of her life. 
(Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) She appeared to recognize that she was 
an intelligent human that could contribute greatly to society. (PSI, p.3.) 
Ms. Cargile also has valuable employment skills. (PSI, pp.7-8.) She has worked 
as a welder, a recycler, tile layer, mason, drywall finisher, window installer, healthcare 
provider, food handler, and animal trainer. (PSI, pp.7-8.) She will have little difficulty 
finding work when released from prison. 
Ms. Cargile has experienced with several illegal substance. (Tr.05/27/2011, p.6, 
Ls.10-20.) Although she does not specifically agree to participate in substance abuse 
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treatment, she indicates that she is willing and wanting to turn her life around, which 
would necessitate treatment. (Tr.05/27/2011, p. 7, Ls.3-14.) 
In light of the evidence presented to the district court, it should have reduced the 
sentence executed upon Ms. Cargile so that she could participate in treatment while 
readjusting to society. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Consecutive Unified 
Sentence Of Four Years, With One Year Fixed 
Ms. Cargile asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of four 
years, with one year fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Cargile does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Ms. Cargile must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
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rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). 
At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Cargile apologized to the court. (Tr.05/26/2011, 
p.12, L.23.) She stated: 
First of all, to you, I'd like to apologize. You did grant me a great 
kindness, and it was not my intention to take advantage of that. And in my 
letter that I addressed to the court for the defendant's version and also to 
be used as the comments to the court, I believe I touched on all of the 
subjects of my immoralities in that letter. And I'm ready to live, and I'm 
ready to lead a new life, and I'm ready to be sentenced. 
(Tr.05/26/2011, p.12, L.23-p.13, L.5.) 
For reasons also identified in section II, Ms. Cargile asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion imposing an excessive sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Cargile respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's order 
denying her suppression motion. She also requests that this Court reduce her 
sentences as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 6th day of July, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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